Abstract-In order to increase the level of fault-tolerance of wireless sensor networks, thus to enhance the reliability and accuracy, we studies the traditional byzantine fault-tolerant program, and makes improvements in the environment of WSNs, reducing the number of rounds of message exchange between network nodes, thus improving the efficiency and reducing communication overhead and energy consumption. The simulation result shows that our program makes all normal network nodes reach an agreement, while the number of rounds of message exchange greatly decreases compared to the traditional byzantine program.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are a distributed self-governance measurement and control network system composed of a lot of tiny sensors with communication and computation abilities. WSNs can make people get a large quantity of detailed and reliable information at any time, at any place, or under any condition; therefore, it is widely applied in national defense and military, environmental monitoring, traffic management, medical treatment and public health, and other fields.
Different application fields have different security requirements for WSNs. In most non-commercial applications such as environmental monitoring and air humidity, the security problem is not very important. However, in other fields such as monitoring the enemy's military deployment in the area occupied by the energy in terms of military, the things varying from data acquisition, data transmission to physical distribution of points have to be kept confidential to the enemy. In those securitysensitive applications, if the networks node in WSNs is captured or energy of the network node is exhausted, the consequence may be disastrous [1] [2] [3] . How to ensure the reliability of whole networks and the security of data transmission becomes the important content of security research on WSNs.
The traditional passive defense method such as encryption and identity authentication, can produce effective defense function on the attack from external part of WSNs. For example, it is unable to discover the originally normal network nodes controlled by the enemy by use of encryption and identity authentication, for there is private key in those network nodes. It is shown through previous research that there still exist loopholes in some network nodes which are vulnerable to the attack no matter how many security defense measures are taken. At the same time, those abovementioned defense measures basically can't confront the security threat from the internal part, such as network node failure [4] [5] . Therefore, the fault-tolerant program becomes the second barrier to guarantee the security.
Due to various limitations (such as computing power and storage space) on WSNs, the traditional fault-tolerant program can't be directly applied in WSNs; therefore, the fault-tolerant program must meet the specific application demand of WSNs. We hereby suggest designing a faulttolerant program for WSNs by use of the advantages of the byzantine fault-tolerant program.
The byzantine fault-tolerant program originated from the byzantine agreement (BA) problem which was put forward by Lamport et al. in 1982 [6] . This problem is defined by Lamport [6] as follows.
(1) The messages sent out from network node can be correctly delivered.
(2) The receiver node knows the sender node who sends this message.
(3) When the number of network nodes is n, the number of network nodes in which the error happens will be (n-1)/3 at most.
Based on the above-mentioned hypothesis, BA problem can be solved [7] , and the steps of solution are generally shown as below.
(1) Any network node is selected as the source network node, and then the source network node sends its initial value v(s) to all other network nodes.
(2) All normal network nodes make use of the message received from the source network node through exchange with other network nodes to check whether other normal network nodes have received the same value.
This solution can meet following requirements.
(1) A consensus can be reached among all normal network nodes.
(2) If the source network node is normal, the common value for which a consensus is reached among all normal network nodes shall be same with the initial value of the source network node.
Currently, the research on applicability of byzantine fault-tolerant program is mainly in the field of distributed computing system and wireless mesh networks [8] - [14] . Wang [14] et al. establishes a fault-tolerant network structure for wireless mesh networks according to traditional byzantine fault-tolerant program and improves routing algorithm, thus improving the reliability of networks. However, for large number of rounds of message exchange between network nodes, it only establishes minimum message exchange unit from fixed topology for control. This is not applicable to WSNs with topological dynamic changes. Klempous [15] et al. applied traditional byzantine fault-tolerant program into WSNs and considered that the performance of faulttolerance depended on the scope of message exchange between network nodes. If the scope of message exchange is too large, the large number of rounds of message exchange between network nodes will cause burden to communication; if the scope of message exchange is too small, normal network nodes cannot reach a consensus comprehensively, thus causing misinformation.
In view of this, we find that the major problem of the application of the byzantine fault-tolerant program into WSNs is that the number of rounds of message exchange between network nodes is too great. Generally, when the total number of network nodes is n and the maximum number of error network nodes is (n-1)/3, the number of rounds of message exchange required by traditional program is (n-1)/3+1 and the amount of message exchange in the ith round (i=1…(n-1)/3+1) is (n-1)(n-2)...(n-i). Which causes a huge communication overhead for WSNs with a large number of network nodes and meanwhile causes huge consumption for sensor with limited energy.
In the research on the traditional byzantine program, two features as follows are noticed: 1) the number of normal network nodes is at least n-(n-1)/3. 2) The total number of messages received from normal network nodes is always higher than that of messages received from error network nodes. If the abovementioned 2 points can be fully utilized, the efficiency of the traditional faulttolerant program can be effectively improved, that is, the energy consumption and communication traffic can be reduced through reducing number of rounds of message exchange between network nodes so that such program can be applicable to WSNs. In this paper, we propose an improved byzantine fault-tolerant program.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the proposed fault-tolerant program. The simulations and their results are analyzed in Section III. Finally, our conclusions and future work are presented in Section IV.
II. IMPROVED BYZANTINE FAULT-TOLERANT PROGRAM
Firstly, the hypothesis of the proposed program is given.
(3) When the number of network nodes is n, the number of network nodes in which the error happens will be (n-1)/3 at most. Furthermore, all error network nodes have abnormal behaviors, that is, the values sent by error network node to other network nodes are different or there is difference between normal value and value sent by error network node.
A. The M-tree Used by Fault-Tolerant Program
In the process of message exchange, each network node uses a specific tree to store messages received from other network nodes after message exchange. This tree is named as M-tree (message tree). Fig. 1 shows its structure. First, the source network node sends its original value v(s) to other network nodes and itself. As the sender of message is recognizable, all normal network nodes can recognize that this message comes from the source network node and store this value in the root node of M-tree. However, this cannot judge whether the source network node is normal network node. Therefore, multiround message exchange between network nodes is required so as to eliminate the influence of error source node. Starting from the second level of M-tree, each node is named with the sender of storing value and father node (the second level is not named with root node). For example, if the storing value of a node in the second level comes from network node x, this node is named as v(x); if the father node of a node in the third level is v(x) and its storing value comes from network node y, this node is named as v(xy); the rest can be done in the same manner. Nodes with continuously repetitive network nodes in the name (such as v(xx), v(yy) and v(xyy)) are not stored in M-tree so as to prevent error network nodes from sending error messages periodically which makes error messages stored in M-tree repeatedly and causes misjudgment. 
B. Decision Process of Trusted Network Nodes
For all network nodes, the decision process of trusted network nodes can be implemented after three rounds of message exchange. First, it is necessary to judge whether the storing value of each node (marked as v(cx)) in the second bottom level of M-tree is equal to the value in the majority (expressed as maj(cx)) among all its corresponding child node values or not. If it is, it is required to judge whether the total number of child nodes (expressed as cou_maj(cx)) with the same value of maj(cx) of each v(cx) is not less than (n-(n-1)/3-1), i.e. judge whether the total number of network nodes with the majority is not less than the minimum total number of normal network nodes. If both of abovementioned conditions are satisfied, the network nodes that sends the )). In general, judging whether a network node can be added into RNPS (cx) shall meet the following 2 conditions:
Then, the total number of each network node in all RNPS in the second bottom level (expressed as cou_RNP(z)) is counted. If cou_RNP(z) of a network node is not less than (n−(n−1)/3−1), this network node is defined as trusted network node.
C. Correction Process of Error Message
After new trusted network node is added, each network node will correct messages from untrusted network node in M-tree to accelerate the election of common value. Subtrees of all nodes in the second bottom level of M-tree will be examined. If the storing value of its child node is different from the value in the majority (expressed as maj(RNP(cx))) among values sent by current trusted network node and the sender node of this value is not trusted network node, the value of child node will be replaced as maj(RNP(cx)).
D. Election Process of Common Value
After all error messages are replaced, M-tree selects majority values from each subtree in the second bottom level and then selects majority values towards the upper level till the root. Then, the common value of this network node is obtained. The example diagram is shown in Fig. 2 .
E. Overall Operational Process of Fault-Tolerant Program
According to the design above, the minimum number of rounds of message exchange is 5. Starting from the 4th round, if no new trusted network node is found in each network node for two consecutive rounds, i.e. all normal network nodes reach a consensus, the operation of the program ends. Fig. 6 shows the details of fault-tolerant program. The main steps is described as below.
Step 1: First, necessary message exchange phase. In the first round of message exchange, the source network node sends its original value v(s) to itself and other network nodes and each network node stores this value in root node of M-tree. Then, go to step 2.
Step 2: In the 2nd round of message exchange, each network node sends root node value in M-tree to itself and all other network nodes and each network node stores the received value in the corresponding node of the second level of M-tree. Then, go to step 3.
Step 3: In the 3rd round of message exchange, each network node sends the storing value in the second level of M-tree to itself and all other network nodes and each network node stores the received value in the corresponding node of the third level of M-tree. Then, go to step 4.
Step 4: After the 3rd round of message exchange, each network node enters decision-making phase and the decision process of trusted network node starts. After the decision process, the condition that whether the cumulative variable null message exchange (cou_nullmess) is less than 2 needs to be judge and the initial value of cou_nullmess is 0. If judgment is false, the operation of the program ends. If judgment is true, then judge whether new trusted network node is found. If the result is true, cou_nullmess returns to 0, go to step 5; otherwise, cou_nullmess pluses 1, start the next round of message exchange and the new decision-making phase.
Step 5: After new trusted network node is added, each network node starts the correction process of error message and replace the message sent by untrusted network node in M-tree. Then, go to step 6.
Step 6: Each network node elects common value and the common value of all normal network nodes is obtained. Then start the next round of message exchange and the new decision-making phase.
F. Example of Applying Fault-Tolerant Program
In this section, An example is given to explain how the proposed fault-tolerant program can make all normal network nodes reach an agreement. We assume in a seven-node WSNs, network nodes are marked as a, b, c, d, e, f, g. Node a is defined as source network node. To check the performance of the proposed program, we design the worst-case scenario, that is Node c and Node e are both error network node. The messaging behavior of the error network nodes is shown in Table 1 . The beginning of the program is the necessary message exchange phase, the source network node a sends its initial value to itself and all other network nodes in the first round of the message exchange. Because the source network node a is normal network node, the sending values are the same and the value is 2. Then, each network node stores this value v(s) in the root of M-tree , as shown in Fig. 3 . Here, the results of error network nodes do not need to be discussed, thus this example only shows the results of normal network nodes. In the 2nd round of message exchange, each network node sends the root value in M-tree to itself and all other network nodes. Similarly, each network node stores the received value in the corresponding node of the second level of M-tree. The results for the second round of message exchange are shown in Fig. 4 .
In the 3rd round of message exchange, each network node sends the storing value in the second level of M-tree to itself and all other network nodes and each network node stores the received value in the corresponding node of the third level of M-tree. The results of all normal network nodes' M-trees are shown in Fig. 5 .
After the 3rd round of message exchange, the program accesses the Decision-making phase, and the first process of this phase is the decision process of trusted network. The process specifics of Node d is shown in Fig. 7 . For example, the Node a, b, d, f , g should be added in RNPS(ab), that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) v(ab) = maj(ab) (2) The program checks whether the cumulative variable null message exchange (cou_nullmess) is less than 2. If the result is false, the program ends. On the contrary, if new trusted network node is found and added, the correction process of error message can be executed, and cou_nullmess returns to 0. If no new trusted network node is found and added, cou_nullmess pluses 1, and the program starts the next round of message exchange and the new decision-making phase. In this example, Node a, b, d, f, g are all new trusted network node and cou_nullmess remains initial state, the value is 0, so the program runs the correction process.
In this process, the values received from the untrusted network nodes in each subtree of the second bottom level of M-tree must be replaced by the majority value of the trusted network node in each subtree. For example, as shown in Fig. 8 , Node c and e are untrusted network nodes in the subtree of v(ab). Furthermore, v(abc) and v(abe) is not equal to the majority value of the trusted network node set of v(ab){v(aba), v(abd), v(abf), v(abg)}. Thus the value of v(abc) and v(abe) must be replaced by 2 (maj(RNP(ab)) = 2).
Finally, the majority values from each subtree in the second bottom level of M-tree can be elected. Then the election process can be executed upwards layer by layer till the root. So far, the decision-making phase has been completed, the program starts the new round of message exchange and repeats the decision-making phase. In this example, all the normal network nodes have reached a agreement in the 3th round of message exchange. So the total number of rounds of message exchange used by this example is 5. This value is equal to the minimum design number of rounds. Fig. 9 shows the comparison of the number of rounds of message exchange in the proposed program and the traditional byzantine program when the source network node is not error network node. Compared to traditional byzantine program, the proposed program has obvious advantages. When the number of error network nodes is small, the number of rounds of message exchange in the proposed program is always the minimum design number of rounds. It slightly increases when the number of error network nodes approaches the maximum value of network design. This is because that network nodes with the normal value in the whole network are always in the majority, i.e. this normal value is always in the majority in M-tree of each network node, thus making the final common value equal to this value. It is unnecessary to find error nodes to determine the final common value through at least (n− 1)/3 +1 rounds of message exchange in traditional byzantine program, thus reducing the number of rounds of message exchange. Fig. 9 , in the proposed program, the number of rounds of message exchange required when the source network node is error network node is generally higher than that when the source network node is not error network node under the condition of same number of error network nodes, because when the source network node is error network node, the original value v(s) sent to all network nodes will be different, which increases the difficulty of determining common value of normal network nodes. The number of rounds of message exchange increases correspondingly. However, compared to traditional byzantine program, the number of rounds of message exchange required in the proposed program is still small.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We study and improve the traditional byzantine faulttolerant program and design a fault-tolerant program applied in WSNs. The proposed program uses normal network nodes in the network as measurement standard of common value, which not only ensures the reliability and correctness of the whole network, but also solves the problem of huge energy consumption and communication overhead caused by large number of rounds of message exchange in traditional byzantine fault-tolerant program. The subsequent simulation proves that the number of rounds of message exchange in the proposed program decreases greatly compared to traditional byzantine faulttolerant program whether or not source network node is error network node. In the future research work, the realtime problem of the proposed program will be considered. We will optimize the code and process of the program, thus making the time spend in reaching all normal network nodes a consensus as short as possible.
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